The Law and Politics of Contested Competences in the European Union

Politics is usually thought of as taking place given a set of constitutional constraints. The constitution notably defines rules governing the exercise of legislative competences by which institutional players must abide when making laws. But sometimes the rules of the game themselves become the object of political contestation. This thesis investigates the conditions under which competences are contested in the European Union (EU). When an institutional system contains more than a single procedural rule for enacting legislation, actors can argue about which rule is more appropriate, in what Joseph Jupille called 'procedural politics'. The doctoral research shows that in the European Union institutional actors are more likely to dispute legislation when its subject matter touches upon several issue areas and when an alternative procedure would confer more influence on one of the players. Disputes are also more likely in the wake of constitutional amendments of the EU Treaties, which introduce uncertainty about applicable procedural rules. Based on their positions in litigation before the European Court of Justice, EU institutions and Member States are shown to have different preferences about European integration. The European Parliament has the most pro-supranational preferences, followed by the Commission and the Court. Competence contestation, however, has a clear cost in that procedurally disputed legislation that ends up before the Court of Justice takes twice as long to adopt compared to uncontested laws.

Jaar van publicatie:2020

Toegankelijkheid:Open