Self-motion and Freedom in Damascius’ Theory of Soul.

Self-motion is a key notion in Plato's philosophy. In multiple works, Plato insists that it is the immortal soul’s essential nature to move itself. Soul’s ability to move itself not only makes it the first cause of all physical motion and life in the universe, but also provides soul with the necessary ontological structure to be truly free in the choices that it makes. Ancient Platonists, recognizing the importance of the doctrine for Platonic philosophy, adopted Plato’s theory of the self-moving soul, but had to deal with Aristotle’s substantial criticism of it. This led to a standard Neoplatonic doctrine that provided an answer to Aristotle’s objections, set out in fullest detail by Proclus. However, his successor Damascius rejected some central aspects of Proclus’ solution, as he felt that Proclus made too many concessions to Aristotle which led him to abandon the fundamental core of Plato’s doctrine. Damascius’ heterodox position on soul’s essential nature as self-mover is highly interesting, but has never been studied. The proposed project intends to provide a philosophical analysis of Damascius’ theory of self-motion and to show how this theory provides the ontological foundation for Damascius’ innovative theory of the soul’s radical freedom.

Keywords:Self-motion, Freedom, Neoplatonism

Disciplines:Classical literature, History of ideas, History of philosophy