Facilitating the transition to a sustainable energy system through consumer-centric energy market design: a game-theoretic modelbased approach

In this project, we contribute to the scientific literature on energy market design in three fields:
First, most future consumer-centric electricity market designs require extensive communication between consumers and, e.g., a market operator on, e.g., behind-the-meter flexibility and detailed load data. This may lead to excessive communication requirements and privacy concerns. We study alternative, pareto-efficient market designs, pursuing the trade-off between market efficiency and limited information exchange.
Second, a common feature of current research on energy market design is the assumption of rational, utility maximizing consumers. Behavioral economists showed that this homo economicus does not exist. Recenty, a few authors have adopted these findings from behavioral economics in electricity market research using prospect theory and satisficing theory. We build on and extend this emerging literature, robustifying electricity market designs w.r.t. the bounded rationality of consumers.
Third, the adoption of multi-energy carrier systems depends on appropriate market structures, engaging consumers and reflecting the intricacies of each energy carrier and its distribution system, as well as the interdependencies between carriers. In this project, we study price formation and market organization in multi-energy carrier systems, an emerging topic in the scientific literature, accounting for possible limited information exchange and bounded rationality of consumers.