Proclus and the Mereological Link Between Ethics and Metaphysics. Perfection as Part of Cosmology

The aim of this project is to investigate the way in which perfection as a concept bridges ethics and metaphysics in late ancient philosophy. It does so through the prism of mereology, or the study of part-whole relations. In ancient philosophy, and especially in the Platonic school of thought, the notion of being whole and the subsequent metaphysical questions of its relation to its parts are often linked to the concept of being complete or perfect (Greek: τέλειος). As a result of this, the whole is considered in Platonic thought not just as a metaphysical structure uniting its parts, but as the best way its parts could be structured.

The focus of the project lies on the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus (5th cent. AD), since in his exegesis of Plato he devotes substantial attention not just to the whole as a metaphysical concept but also to its relation to the Platonic notions of perfection and goodness.

The study is divided into three parts. Firstly, a conceptual framework for the analysis is derived from the efforts of contemporary philosophers such as David Lewis and Peter Van Inwagen to pin down the identity of the whole and determine whether this identity is separate from the sum of the parts. Special attention is also paid to the mereological analyses of Verity Harte and Kathrin Koslicki, for they specifically apply the lens of contemporary mereology to Plato and Aristotle and thus lay bare another opposition present in ancient discussions of parts and wholes, i.e., whether the whole is not only distinct from its parts but prior to them in a logical or metaphysical sense.

The second part of the study aims to trace Proclus’ general understanding of the notions of composition and wholeness, respectively, and the models he employs to define these concepts. The main sources in this phase of the research are the Elements of Theology and Platonic Theology. Proclus’ concept of composition is studied through an analysis of the ’rule of Proclus’ (as named by the philosopher Olympiodorus), which states that any productive principle has a greater causal reach than inferior productive principles, but a shorter reach than superior ones. As a result of this, the beings which exist in the middle of the causal hierarchy proceeding from the Neoplatonic first principle, the One, to the ultimate material substrate are, in Proclus’ words, ‘more composite’ (Elements of Theology §58). This metaphysical rule is contrasted to the more general Neoplatonic notion that any principle in the procession from the One to matter is more pluralized than its predecessor (Elements of Theology §62). Proclus’ threefold division of wholeness (Elements of Theology §67-69) is also analyzed in this phase of the project. Although the theoretical framework of the three kinds of wholeness has been analyzed quite often by contemporary scholars, their readings of this theorem tend to diverge from one another. In order to unify these various readings, special attention is paid to relatively understudied passages from book III of the Platonic Theology, where Proclus grounds his mereological model in passages from Plato’s Parmenides, Philebus, and Timaeus.

Thirdly, Proclus’ application of the concept of wholeness in his theological system and his cosmology is discussed. The main throughline in this phase of the project is the equation of wholeness with eternity, an equation which again follows from Proclus’ exegesis of the Parmenides, Philebus, and Timaeus. Analysis of the Platonic Theology, specifically books three through five, is performed to discern how Proclus uses his reframing of wholeness as eternal, and thus stable, goodness in the Neoplatonic hypostasis of Intellect to explain the overlap between being whole and being perfect. The Timaeus-commentary, wherein Proclus describes the production of the material universe and its inhabitants, is also analyzed to discern how the equation of wholeness with eternity influences the mereological status of mortal beings.