On marriage markets and household decision behavior.

Do women work more when divorce laws are less favorable to them? How unequal is the distribution of time and money within couples? There is a growing interest in economics in questions like these. A key role is played by the collective model, which explicitly recognizes that multi-person households consist of different individuals with own preferences. Observed consumption and labor supply choices are then the result of the interaction between household members. This interaction depends on the individuals’ preferences, their bargaining positions and their financial and time constraints. The applicants have been developing methods, based on the theory of revealed preference, to analyze this kind of behavior in a robust manner. In this research project, we would like to investigate the effects of marriage market dynamics on intra-household decision making. We argue that the modeling of marriage market effects implies a better description of the intra-household decision process, which in turn yields more powerful analyses. The research project should result in fully worked applications that integrate marriage market effects in household choice behavior. In addition, we would like to design an easy-to-apply toolkit for revealed preference analysis. This to put our methods, which are robust and general in nature, in the toolkit of applied economists, who are interested in the investigation of the above highly policy relevant questions.