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To which extent is it realistic; assuming that
policymakers are mere transmission belts of societal interests? In the area of
trade policy we observed that, despite a stronger mobilization of protectionist
interests, the resulting policy was mostly liberalization. In the literature
this is explained by the autonomy of the policymaker. Autonomy might be an
important condition, it is far from sufficient. The rigor and detail by which
studies on government autonomy have been undertaken contrasts heavily with the
little work available on what the policy-maker does with this autonomy. Why
would we assume that the European Commission (EC) is in favor of
liberalization? What if the EC is guided by geo-economic motives? Starting from
the Lisbon-strategy, we want to assess whether such policy motives are present
within the EC and to which extent these determine the resulting policy.
To this end we will operationalize the policy
preferences in the EC through a survey. Continuing the work started by Hooghe
(2002), we will additionally focus on the presence of geo-economic motives. Subsequently
we will analyze four policy domains in which we expect such motives to play a
role. These are trade policy, competition policy, exchange rate policy and
international environmental policy.
Project
Politics without Principals: National Trade Administrations and EU Trade Policy
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To which extent is it realistic; assuming that
policymakers are mere transmission belts of societal interests? In the area of
trade policy we observed that, despite a stronger mobilization of protectionist
interests, the resulting policy was mostly liberalization. In the literature
this is explained by the autonomy of the policymaker. Autonomy might be an
important condition, it is far from sufficient. The rigor and detail by which
studies on government autonomy have been undertaken contrasts heavily with the
little work available on what the policy-maker does with this autonomy. Why
would we assume that the European Commission (EC) is in favor of
liberalization? What if the EC is guided by geo-economic motives? Starting from
the Lisbon-strategy, we want to assess whether such policy motives are present
within the EC and to which extent these determine the resulting policy.
To this end we will operationalize the policy
preferences in the EC through a survey. Continuing the work started by Hooghe
(2002), we will additionally focus on the presence of geo-economic motives. Subsequently
we will analyze four policy domains in which we expect such motives to play a
role. These are trade policy, competition policy, exchange rate policy and
international environmental policy.
Date:1 Jan 2009 → 13 Jun 2014
Keywords:Europese Commissie, economisch beleid, c
Disciplines:Other economics and business, Citizenship, immigration and political inequality, International and comparative politics, Multilevel governance, National politics, Political behaviour, Political organisations and institutions, Political theory and methodology, Public administration, Other political science
Project type:PhD project