< Terug naar vorige pagina


Trade-offs in Protecting Keccak Against Combined Side-Channel and Fault Attacks

Boekbijdrage - Boekhoofdstuk Conferentiebijdrage

© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. When deployed in a potentially hostile environment, security-critical devices are susceptible to physical attacks. Consequently, cryptographic implementations need to be protected against side-channel analysis, fault attacks and attacks that combine both approaches. CAPA (CRYPTO 2018) is an algorithm-level combined countermeasure, based on MPC, with provable security in a strong attacker model. A key challenge for combined countermeasures, and CAPA in particular, is the implementation cost. In this work, we use CAPA to obtain the first hardware implementations of Keccak (SHA-3) with resistance against combined side-channel and fault attacks. We systematically explore the speed-area trade-off and show that CAPA, in spite of its algorithmic overhead, can be very fast or reasonably small. In fact, for the standardized Keccak-f[1600] instance, our low-latency version is nearly twice as fast as the previous implementations that only consider side-channel security, at the cost of area and randomness consumption. For all four presented designs, the protection level for side-channel and fault attacks can be scaled separately and to arbitrary order. To evaluate the physical security, we assess the side-channel leakage of a representative second-order secure implementation on FPGA. In addition, we experimentally validate the claimed fault detection probability.
Boek: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Pagina's: 285 - 302
Jaar van publicatie:2019