Exclusive powers and self-governed entities: a tool for defensive federalism?

This chapter revolves around the question of whether the technique of power allocation, and exclusive powers in particular, can serve as a tool for defensive federalism by protecting subnational autonomy. It shows that while exclusivity, in theory, is a device for dual federalism, it does not necessarily guarantee effective protection of subnational autonomy, and may have undesirable side-effects. Importantly, the chapter concludes that the technique of power allocation does not stand on its own. Centralizing effects are reinforced or mitigated by the dynamics of the entire system. The choice for exclusive or shared powers as the device for the distribution of powers, then, is part of the question that determines the entire design of the multi-tiered system: what is the proper balance between claims for subnational autonomy on the one hand, and cohesion and effectiveness of the entire system on the other. It is a dynamic balance, with institutional ‘hubs for change’ such as courts that accommodate the system to changing preferences. To make for a robust system, it is also a balance that requires the support of all the entities that constitute the multi-tiered system. This touches upon the paradox of defensive federalism. On the one hand, the need for ‘defensive federalism’ is felt in particular in those systems where the central authority is considered too dominant. This is especially the case in multinational systems where relations between the central government and subnational groups are based on distrust. At the same time, the introduction of defensive federalism is reliant upon the goodwill of the central government that drafts the institutional design. This means that the implementation of defensive federalism presupposes a basic predisposition for balanced power relations that make the need for ‘defensive’ federalism obsolete.

ISBN:978-1-032-28196-4

Jaar van publicatie:2022

Trefwoorden:H1 Book chapter

Toegankelijkheid:Closed