'Knowledge is Perception'. A Map of the First Part of Plato's Theaetetus

The first part of Plato's Theaetetus (151e-187a) is the subject of heated scholarly debate. There Socrates analyzes and refutes Theaetetus definition of knowledge: 'knowledge is perception'. In this dissertation, I argue that these debates cannot be resolved as if we do not consider two different and equally important elements: the first is the philosophical argument, the second is the dramatic context in which the arguments are embedded. Despite the growing consensus that these two elements should be used in conjunction rather than in opposition, scholars mostly continue to focus on either one or the other, but rarely on both principles, while interpreting the first part of the Theaetetus. One crucial claim I shall defend is that the dialogue's literary structure is vital for understanding the ways in which the dialogue's main ideas and arguments are interconnected. The other crucial claim I shall defend is that the thorny question of whether the dialogue depends on the theory of Forms is framed in the wrong terms, because it importantly overlooks the peculiar specificity of the Theaetetus. As I see it, in this dialogue Plato is not interested in establishing or indirectly suggesting the ontological status of the objects of knowledge, but, rather, in the following: (1) showing that a rival view to his philosophy is untenable because it assumes, wrongly, that knowledge exists without things themselves. (2) Suggesting that knowledge is the result of dialectic or critical reflection and that things themselves are the proper objects of knowledge. My contention is that neither of the two claims implies or precludes the existence of Forms.

Jaar van publicatie:2021

Toegankelijkheid:Open