Factive islands and meaning-driven unacceptability

It is often proposed that the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable sentence can be rooted in its meaning. Elaborating on Oshima (2008), we argue that the meaning-driven unacceptability of factive islands must make reference to felicity conditions, and cannot be reduced to the triviality of propositional content. We also observe, again elaborating on Oshima, that the triviality of factive islands need not be logical, but can be relative to a listener’s background assumptions. These findings call for a revision of a prevalent view about meaning-driven unacceptability, according to which unacceptability results from triviality that is both propositional and logical.

Jaar van publicatie:2018

BOF-keylabel:ja

IOF-keylabel:ja

BOF-publication weight:0.1

Auteurs:International

Authors from:Higher Education

Toegankelijkheid:Open