< Terug naar vorige pagina

Publicatie

Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making

Boekbijdrage - Hoofdstuk

The chapter explores the role of the European Commission as a manager of information asymmetry in the context of EU external trade policy-making. The authors illustrate that under conditions of incomplete contracting and interdependence, the Commission-as-agent has incentives to proactively reduce information asymmetry vis-à-vis the Council-as-principal. To do so, it has devised specific communication structures known in the EU jargon as “informal technical meetings”. The existence of informal technical meetings in EU external trade negotiations – a classic example of principal-agent relations – illustrates that there is room in the principal-agent model for rectifying the anti-agent bias and the single-minded focus on goal conflict. The authors introduce the concept of “controlled indiscretion” as a way in which principal-agent scholars can address these prevalent biases in the principal-agent model.
Boek: The Principal Agent Model and the European Union
Pagina's: 227 - 253
ISBN:978-3-319-55137-1
Jaar van publicatie:2017
Toegankelijkheid:Closed