Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal-Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations

© 2017 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd Applying a principal-agent perspective on trilogue negotiations, this article examines how the rapporteur and the Presidency, as agents of respectively the European Parliament and the Council, are able to reach a deal with their fellow agent while avoiding an involuntary defection among their principals. Despite these intra- and inter-institutional constraints, early agreements can be concluded because agents execute two parallel tasks on behalf of their principals: representing them inter-institutionally and acting as the deal-facilitator intra-institutionally. We identify three ways in which the agents can combine these two acts of delegation and conclude an early agreement: (1) creating a tied-hand situation for themselves; (2) affecting the intra-institutional coalition formation by bringing in allies from the other institution; and (3) actively searching for signals from the principals and the fellow agent on the zone of possible agreement. We illustrate these dynamics through a case study of the policy-making process on the 2015 Decision on the Market Stability Reserve.

Jaar van publicatie:2018