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Outside CEOs, board control and the financing policy of small privately held family firms
Tijdschriftbijdrage - Tijdschriftartikel
We investigate how the presence of an-outside CEO is related to the financing policy of privately held family firms, taking into account the degree of family control via the board of directors. For a sample of 367 Belgian firms we find that family firms with an outside CEO have a lower leverage, although they take more entrepreneurial risk. The negative relation between the presence of an outside CEO and leverage is more pronounced for long-term debt than for short-term debt. Family control via the board of directors reduces the effect of an outside CEO on entrepreneurial risk and leverage. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Tijdschrift: Journal of family business strategy
ISSN: 1877-8585
Volume: 8
Pagina's: 29 - 41
Jaar van publicatie:2017
Trefwoorden:A1 Journal article
BOF-keylabel:ja
BOF-publication weight:2
CSS-citation score:1
Authors from:Higher Education
Toegankelijkheid:Open