The Value of Belief: Plato on the Epistemological and Practical Value of doxa

The proposed project aims at a new appraisal of belief (doxa) in Plato, focusing on its role within his concept of knowledge. This requires departing from the viewpoint of most available research on this topic, as the majority of scholarship on Plato’s epistemology still pejoratively conceives of the concept of belief. Knowledge is often seen as being sharply distinguished from belief and the former’s theoretical as well as practical superiority over the latter is regularly stressed. By answering the following five guiding questions, my research aims at providing a more candid systematic study on the value of belief in Plato: In which way are an ontological difference between Forms and sensible objects and the distinction between knowledge and belief related? Which role does belief play in the acquisition of knowledge? Is belief generally inferior to knowledge in the pursuit of a happy life? How well may belief guide individual and collective actions and judgments? May acquiring (true) belief be a goal in itself? The Platonic dialogues Meno, Republic, Theaetetus, Timaeus, and Philebus shall provide the basis for the treatment of these questions, as they seem to paint quite different pictures of belief. A reliable study that, first, accommodates such apparent differences in the depiction of belief and, second, develops a clearer understanding of the value that belief has in Plato’s concept of knowledge is still missing. My project aims at filling this gap in scholarship.

Keywords:Plato, Epistemology, Belief, Knowledge, doxa, Ancient Philosophy

Disciplines:Philosophy not elsewhere classified

Project type:PhD project