Towards Postfeminist Thinking? A Wittgensteinian Solution to a Semantic-Political Problem in Contemporary Feminist Theory.

What is a 'woman'? At a time where traditional gender categories are profoundly criticized and rethought, this seemingly easy question generates much debate amongst feminist advocates. On the one hand, any substantive definition inevitably comes with a normative claim of what it means to be a 'real woman'. Since the women's movement tries to show how women come in all shapes and forms and, moreover, how they are capable of doing anything they put their minds to, it goes without saying that feminists should steer clear from imposing new gender norms themselves. However, on the other hand, a complete refusal to define the concept 'woman' leads to the inability of talking about women as a social category, and hence complicates a feminist plea for women's rights. After all, if feminists are incapable of somehow clarifying what a 'woman' is, how can they describe their own mission and target group? It is my aim to enter into the debate and point out that an ordinary language philosophy can shed new light on the matter. I will argue that through this approach, it becomes possible of going beyond the above mentioned dilemma and of reinterpreting the concept 'woman' in a way that it can sustainably deal with the challenges it faces today. In doing so, I will also provide a way of discussing ethical matters concerning gender equality more accurately and face the daunting question whether the conceptual crisis regarding 'woman' irrevocably heralds the end of feminism.

Keywords:WOMEN, FEMINISM, GENDER

Disciplines:Metaphysics, Feminist philosophy, Philosophy of language, Metaethics