From Theory of Mind to Vicarious Perception

I urge a shift of emphasis in the study of social cognition from 'theory of mind' to a simple perceptual process: the perception of objects as affording a certain action to another agent. This perceptual process, which I call 'vicarious perception', is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states of another agent. I argue that the most convincing experiments that are supposed to show that non-human primates have theory of mind in fact demonstrate that they are capable of vicarious perception. The same is true for the experiments about the theory of mind of less than 12 month old infants.

Keywords:ANIMAL ETHOLOGY, CHILD DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL COGNITION, SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Disciplines:Biological and physiological psychology, General psychology, Other psychology and cognitive sciences, Theory and methodology of philosophy, Philosophy, Other philosophy, ethics and religious studies not elsewhere classified