On the Legal Theory of Compliance with WTO Rulings and Mutually Agreed Solutions : Defensive Dispute Settlement Experiences of the European Union and India.

So far the vast majority of WTO compliance studies have been ‘quantitative’ in nature, in that, they focus on the timeliness aspect of compliance. However, the ‘quality’ or completeness of compliance has mostly been left out. This presents us with a skewed picture of global (and individual) compliance, which does both theoretical and practical harm. WTO law, interpreted one way, does show a preference towards ‘full’ or ‘substantial’ compliance. Additionally, only compliance with decisions (panel and Appellate Body rulings) has been studied; so we know very little about what goes on once a Mutually Agreed Solution is brokered between disputing parties. Since individually studying each WTO Member’s compliance results in incomputable variance, two highly representative, yet juxtaposition-friendly players have been chosen – India, a flag-bearer for the developing world, and EU, the world’s largest (and most successful) economic integration project. All adverse decisions against these two, as well as Mutually Agreed Solutions brokered by them, will be read, and with the assistance of ‘status reports’ submitted to the WTO, the new (or amended) rules, law, or regulations, will be checked for WTO compatibility. Trends, such as those observed in complainant-respondent or issue-specific dynamics, will be identified and explained. This will give us a clearer idea of how (and how much) EU and India comply with WTO decisions and solutions.