The concept of knowability: historical and contemporary approaches

Famously, the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In the argument knowability is analyzed in terms of having the counterfactual possibility to know, which is a non-factive notion, i.e., a notion that does not imply truth. Several philosophers claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. A factive notion of knowability is one that implies truth. Although Frederic Fitch formulated this paradox in 1963 and since then there has been considerable scholarship concerning this topic, my PhD research project aims to provide new insights by studying in 18th -20th century anti-realism. Particularly, I will focus on the comparative analysis of the concepts of knowability found in some key anti-realistic traditions, such as metaphysical anti-realism (idealism, phenomenology), scientific anti-realism (logical positivism/empiricism) and semantic anti-realism (neo-intuitionism). By systematically studying the historical concepts of knowability and other epistemic blankables, including factive and non-factive blankables, my PhD project aims to throw light on the relations of those concepts with the contemporary conceptualizations.