Smugglers

Subtitle:cooperation, organization and adaptability of smuggling networks in the Southern Netherlands, 1797-1810

While historiography has mostly focused on the causes of smuggling, the factors explaining its persistency have remained largely underexposed. Scholars have usually attributed the inability to stop smuggling to the inefficiency or inadequacy of authorities. Even though this is true to some extent, historians have rarely looked at this from the perspective of smugglers. By applying new perspectives from criminology and the history of crime, this research has shown that the organization and adaptability of smuggling networks was partly responsible for the resilience of smuggling. Combining different sets of sources, most notably sentence books from the Antwerp correctional court and analyses made by the Parisian anti-fraud commission which contained new unique sources such as ego-documents written by smugglers themselves, this research flipped the perspective to study smugglers ‘from below’. This novel approach has shown that smugglers operating in the Belgian departments between 1797 and 1810 developed an elaborate and sophisticated smuggling organization to deal with the mounting repressive measures that increased throughout the period. Enforcement of custom laws was primarily a responsibility of the customs, which saw its number of agents rising during in the years between 1797 and 1810. On occasion, their numbers were supplemented by members of the gendarmerie and, in rare cases, the army. Although it could be explained as a laxity in repression, the decrease in the number of confiscations near the end of the decade might actually indicate a success on behalf of repressive measures as part of the Continental Blockade. The French government reinforced its struggle against smuggling with the establishment of an extra-judicial anti-fraud commission, established in 1808 to retroactively investigate the networks of internationally operating merchants in the Belgian departments and levied heavy fines to ‘hit them where it hurts’. Smugglers adapted to these measures on many different levels and showed ingenuity in dealing with changes in legislation and repression. The product range that was carried by the contraband trade proved remarkably diverse and was adapted to both market forces and changes in repression. While in the early years it consisted mostly of cotton fabrics, the product range was increasingly diversified to include refined sugar, processed tobacco, coffee, cocoa, spices and dyes. Of course, this depended partly on legislation, but the market played an important role too. When, for example, the local industries proved able to supply the domestic market with fabrics, textiles were quickly substituted by colonial products. This diversification was also caused by intensifying repression and changes in legislation. Smuggling as a practice, however, did not appear or intensify with the instigation of the Continental Blockade but was under way long before that. To avoid confiscation, smugglers increasingly opted to traffic goods that were both more valuable and could be transported in smaller quantities. Trafficking itself was done by skilled employees with a certain profile that provided opportunities for smuggling. The occupational embeddedness of smuggling caused the mobile professions, day laborers, farmers and innkeepers to be omnipresent in the contraband trade. These professions provided its practitioners with attributes that were much needed in smuggling. By picking the right people, smuggling could be organized as efficiently as possible. Furthermore, each of these professions was assigned a specific position within the supply chain. The supply chain and the routes taken were specifically designed to overcome issues such as confiscation. Contraband was transported in bulk to small town warehouses on the northern side of the border, from where porters picked up small batches of contraband. By carrying contraband afoot over the border, smugglers tried to circumvent border patrols by making good use of the landscape. Once the rayon – the region where patrols took place – was traversed, the contraband was quickly deposited in the makeshift warehouses owned by farmers and innkeepers. From there it was picked up by carters to be transported in bulk further southwards to cities such as Lier and Malines and finally Brussels and – to a lesser extent – Antwerp. This supply chain was organized by a network of intermediaries and merchants that formed neither a top-down hierarchy nor a disorganized mishmash of rapidly succeeding enterprises. Rather, the contraband trade was organized by a handful of intermediaries who offered their services to merchants looking to import illicit goods. These intermediaries who were primarily located in cities such as Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom then relied on local traffickers to get the contraband over the border. Resembling legal trade, these middlemen working on commission were less at risk because they did not invest in the contraband, while simultaneously obscuring the ownership. Négociants, on the other hand, profited from this arrangement because they were not directly involved in the contraband trade. They ordered and received illicit goods, for which they might have used their pre-existing legal trade networks. By doing this, these merchants did instigate the contraband trade. Cooperation was not without risk. The practice of smuggling shows an elaborate system of internal and external risk mitigation strategies. To spread external risks, of which confiscation was the most common, smugglers bribed officials, insured shipments, smuggled in large groups and primarily at night, concealed contraband, forged documents, or, rarely, resorted to violence. Internal risks, such as theft or discord, were mitigated by a high remuneration of porters and a wide array of trust enhancing mechanisms that was characterized by sociability, gift giving and operating in social settings that further stimulated reciprocity. By cooperating, these networks were able to develop a sophisticated organization that proved hard to eradicate. It is significant that this organization never really was dismantled. Of course, traffickers were arrested, and merchants were fined, but the overall structures remained in place. While playing a crucial role, intermediaries were largely left alone. Both courts and the anti-fraud commission could not eradicate the contraband trade. The only strategy that proved fruitful was to attack the supply lines. This, however, was only a temporary solution as the relocation of the border merely shifted the problem. Smuggling was redirected to the outer fringes of the French Empire. This research has shown that smuggling in the Napoleonic era was not a form of social protest. Rather, contraband networks capitalized on the implementation of restrictive legislation and used the border to make a profit. It also nuanced smuggling as a survival strategy. The people that carried out the smuggling were not small-timers but rather part of a well-oiled machine that was from top to bottom designed to be efficient. While it probably still was part of the makeshift economy for many of the lower tier traffickers, the contraband trade was not open to everyone. Instead, only those with a particular profile were able to participate. As such, smuggling was not the social inclusive activity it is always portrayed to have been. As smuggling was widespread even before November 1806, the Continental Blockade did not force people – both porter and merchant – into smuggling. Indeed, smuggling was widespread before the advent of the Blockade. Networks seem to have capitalized on the implementation of restrictive legislation long before the Continental Blockade was implemented. Rather than causing it, the Blockade indeed seems to have curbed smuggling. Although it did not end the contraband trade, it at least forced smugglers to adapt. From this, it follows that smuggling was merely an alternative for (legal) trade. As the contraband trade could never reach the scale of legal trade, it never substituted or replaced it. Although its scale could not match that of legal trade, this does not necessarily mean smuggling was small-scale. Instead, this period showed an unprecedented scale of illicit trade. The smuggling networks investigated in this research show a level of sophistication and organization that resembles modern-day organized crime. Its organization sought to provide a domestic market with prohibited goods by circumventing mounting repressive measures with a range of rational strategies. The resulting networks proved remarkably resilient by adapting to local circumstances. During the Napoleonic era, it might be argued, the right conditions arose that led to an unprecedented professionalization that saw the birth of organized crime on an international scale.

Publication year:2021

Keywords:Doctoral thesis

Accessibility:Open