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P.F. Strawson Was Neither an Externalist nor an Internalist About Moral Responsibility

Journal Contribution - Journal Article

Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent’s mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent’s overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria (2014a; 2014b; 2015) has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. Strawson himself was an externalist. I believe that Ciurria’s reading of Strawson is problematic. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Strawson’s position with regard to the internalism-externalism issue against the background of Ciurria’s reading of him. I conclude that Strawson was neither an internalist nor an externalist about moral responsibility. I draw extensively upon the whole body of Strawson’s work, much of which is sadly neglected in discussions of ‘Freedom and Resentment’, although it illuminates many of the issues discussed there.
Journal: European Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: 0966-8373
Issue: 1
Volume: 29
Pages: 199 - 214
Publication year:2021
BOF-keylabel:yes
IOF-keylabel:yes
CSS-citation score:2
Authors from:Higher Education
Accessibility:Open