Time-Dependent Strategies in Games of Timing

Timing, a central aspect of decision-making in security scenarios, is a subject of growing academic interest; frequently in the context of stealthy attacks, or advanced persistent threats (APTs). A key model in this research landscape is FlipIt. However, a limiting simplifying assumption in the FlipIt literature is that costs and gains are not subject to discounting, which contradicts the typical treatment of decision-making over time in most economically relevant contexts. Our recent work introduces an adaptation of the FlipIt model that applies time-based exponential discounting to the value of a protected resource, while allowing players to choose from among the same canonical strategies as in the original game. This paper extends the study of games of timing by introducing two new classes of strategies that are fundamentally motivated by a time-discounted world view. Within our game model, we compute player utilities, best responses and give a partial characterization of the game’s Nash equilibria. Our model allows us to re-interpret the APT model using a finite total valuation, and a finite time horizon. By applying time-based discounting to the entire decision-making framework, we increase the level of realism as well as applicability to organizational security management.

ISBN:978-3-030-32430-8

Publication year:2019

BOF-keylabel:yes

IOF-keylabel:yes

Authors from:Higher Education

Accessibility:Open