Safeguards of stability in asymmetrical constitutional systems.

Most traditional federal theory remains grounded in the notion that asymmetrical constitutional arrangements are somewhat exceptional. According to contemporary federal theory, however, recent systems are composed of several tiers of government and different identities. They produce asymmetrical responses by default to accommodate differences arising from complex relationships among tiers and groups. While asymmetrical solutions often seem necessary, this implies that some degree of constitutional asymmetry may provide grounds for the instability of the system. Therefore, a more comprehensive approach is needed to investigate constitutional asymmetries as a cause of instability. It will require identifying safeguards of stability in systems with established constitutional asymmetries by empirically examining the level of stability across all systems and distinguishing factors that undermine or support stability.

Keywords:STABILITY, CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

Disciplines:Comparative law, Constitutional law, Regionalisation and decentralisation, Federalism, Multilevel governance not elsewhere classified