The role of (constitutional) courts in fiscal governance: the balanced budget requirement.

The reforms in fiscal and budgetary governance triggered by the 2008 financial crisis brought about a major shift in governance architecture and instruments. A prominent feature is the obligation for Member States to have a sound and balanced public budget. This creates a tension between parliamentary democracy, human rights and a sound public financial status. Instead of a top-down approach, a coordinating system is set up that triggers fiscal responsibility at the national level, yielding paradoxical results. While the budget is to an extent depoliticized, a conflict of constitutional principles and values arises. In some cases, the forum for this balancing exercise will be the judiciary - a far cry from their role as the mere bouches de la loi. But the national balancing act – hypothesise a budget in deficit justified on human rights claims - might have important consequences on the European level. A clash between national authorities and the European Commission or the Court of Justice on budgetary matters is a plausible option due to the new regulatory framework. Two research questions are put forward: firstly, what are the normative arguments underpinning judicial involvement? Several problems arise with respect to the separation of powers and the legitimacy questions intertwined with such a review. Secondly, how should judges approach questions related to public finances: for instance, how to discern between structural and cyclical deviations? -

Keywords:CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

Disciplines:Law