The impossible possibility of environmental ethics, Emmanuel Levinas and the discrete Other

Environmental ethicists have long reacted against the objectified relationship of human beings with nature, since it is assumed to contribute to a commodisation of nature. Neil Everden (1989) calls it the nature-as-object view in which people consider themselves apart from nature. Seeking to provide an alternative view, these environmental ethicists have tried to deeply ground an opposite stance, emphasizing man's inherent embeddedness in nature, or kinship relation with the ecosystem at large (Matthews 1991, Fox 1990).This stance is labeled the nature-as-self, "extended-self" or nature-as-"like-self" view (Everden 1989:158). Although this position might seem more likely to generate an ethical relation with nature, there are voices questioning that claim. Conceiving nature too much as continuous, homogeneous and predictable, such as is implied in both the nature-as-object view and the nature-as-self view, would be counterproductive to having an ethical relation with nature. Both aforementioned views would not leave enough room for the "pockets of resistance" (Everden 1989:160), i.e. unique experiences in nature also described as "nature-as-miracle" experiences, which leave us with the inability to reduce nature to homogeneity. Evernden assumes that all people have such unique experiences in nature. They may broadly be defined as occurrences that transcend normal understanding

Keywords:environment