The Political Economy of Euroscepticism, Referenda and Primaries in an Integrated Europe

In recent decades voters in Europe and North America have become less loyal to political parties. Support for mainstream parties has declined and radical populist parties prosper. In the European Union (EU) this evolution has led to more Euroscepticism. One way mainstream politicians have responded is by giving voters a more direct role in the political process. Examples include the use of referenda on EU-related issues in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK), and on constitutional reform in Italy, and the organization of presidential primaries in France. This project studies three aspects of this evolution. First, I analyze whether politicians’ incentives lead to more EU integration than their voters desire, and whether this contributes to a rise in Euroscepticism. Second, I examine the use of referenda in making political systems more responsive to voters, in the EU and elsewhere. Third, I study whether primaries contribute to bridging the gap between voters and their representatives. I present political-economic, game-theoretical models of integration, referenda and primaries. The models yield clear, testable conclusions. They study under what conditions politicians pursue more integration than voters want, whether referenda reduce this incentive and bring policies closer to voters, and whether primaries benefit voters and increase parties’ chances of winning elections. I run econometric analyses and perform case studies to test and illustrate my conclusions.