Talking about Human Kinds: The Normative Implications of Generic Stereotypes

Stereotypes are the pictures that come to mind when thinking about a category of people. While most of these generalizations are quite innocent, some of them are so bad that it seems wrong just to believe in them. According to the traditional view, stereotypes are epistemically and morally problematic because they are negative and false universalizations that only prejudiced people would hold. This traditional view is still very influential, both in psychology and in philosophy. Yet, some of the most objectionable stereotypes do not fit this analysis. Take, for example, the stereotype that ‘Muslims are terrorists’. According to the traditional view, this stereotype asserts that ‘all Muslims are terrorists’, and hence constitutes a false universalization. However, this stereotype has a generic form. Generics are generalizations that are not explicitly quantified, like ‘tigers are striped’ or ‘birds lay eggs’. Although they are generalizations, they do not assert that all X are Y. The traditional view therefore fails to explain what generic stereotypes mean and what makes some of them so objectionable. This research project aims to develop the cognitive psychological hypothesis that generics express our multi-purpose default generalizations. This theory will then be used to advance a systematic analysis of the objectionable nature of generic stereotypes, and to evaluate the broader use of generics about people in scientific research and public discourse.