Giles of Rome's Metaphysical Thought. The Relationship Between Esse and Essence

The aim of my doctoral research is to study the relationship between esse and essence as it is understood by Giles of Rome (d. 1316). Although Giles is famously known to hold the view that esse and essence are really distinct as two things (duae res) are distinct, this doctrine of real distinction between esse and essence has to a certain extent eclipsed other aspects of Giles’ metaphysical thought in modern scholarship. My dissertation brings the doctrine of real distinction between esse and essence and other elements of Giles’ metaphysical thought into perspective by showing that the doctrine of real distinction is but one aspect of Giles’ understanding of the relationship between esse and essence. For Giles, just as esse and essence are really distinct, esse and essence are also interdependent (chapter 1). I argue that Giles’ doctrine of participation can be understood as comprising these two aspects, namely, the real distinction and the interdependence between esse and essence. In order to prepare the reader for my analysis of Giles’ thought in later chapters, I compare and contrast Giles’ understanding of substantial change, on the one hand, and of creation, on the other hand (chapter 2), drawing special attention to the form-like character of esse, which for Giles is the form of being. Then I study one of Giles’ arguments for the oneness of pure esse (i.e., God) to show that, given the analogy of being, since there is no composition between really distinct esse and essence in pure esse, there cannot be a multiplicity of pure esse. The corollary is of paramount importance: since there is a composition between really distinct esse and essence in other creatures, there is a multiplicity of created esse (chapter 3). I also propose two models of participation, i.e., the subject-addition model and the imitation model, in Giles’ thought, and argue that these models complement each other (chapter 4). I argue that Giles’ famous formulation that that esse and essence are distinct as two things (duae res) are distinct must be understood in light of the doctrine of participation (chapter 5). Giles’ theory of modes should also be understood in connection to the doctrine of participation, especially with respect to what I call the participation-mode (chapter 6).