European trade policy.

This project studies institutional reform and antidumping policy in the European Union (EU). Antidumping policy seeks to discourage dumping: foreign companies from selling products at prices below the cost or below the prices they set in their domestic markets. The project presents political-economic analyses, i.e., economic analyses of political institutions and processes. In particular it studies (1) institutional reform in the EU, (2) the EU’s procedures to set antidumping policy, and (3) the reform of these antidumping procedures. I first analyze institutional reform in the EU, i.e., the empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the move from the consultation to the codecision procedure. Under the former procedure the EP is merely consulted, whereas under the latter it codecides together with the member states in the Council. These procedures have been studied extensively in the political-economic literature, but little attention has been paid to the choice of procedure and what drives member states to empower the EP. Next I study the EU’s antidumping procedure. The Commission can propose antidumping duties for foreign companies. The Council then decide on the duties. The analysis will identify the key players in the procedure. Currently the EP is not involved in the this procedure. In the last part of the project I will analyze the implications of empowering the EP in this procedure. In particular I will study the effect on the level of duties imposed.