Antidumping policy and political business strategies in the European Union.

Political economists have paid considerable attention to the legislative procedures in the

European Union (EU). The use of game-theoretical models has become a standard

approach to analyze how procedures affect the policies that emerge from the legislative

process.

There is little game-theoretical work, however, on the budgetary policies of the EU, and

the EU’s role in the budgetary policies of its member states. This project presents gametheoretical

models of (1) the EU’s budgetary process, (2) the EU’s monitoring of the

member states’ budgetary policies, and (3) the functioning of the recently created

stability funds. It tests the models’ conclusions empirically.

The project will show how the procedures in the EU budgetary process, the preferences

of the players involved, and the status quo explain the size and make-up of the EU

budget. It will analyze how procedural changes and institutional reform affect the budget.

Furthermore the project will study how the EU’s monitoring of the budgetary policies of

its member states affects these policies and whether the recently agreed closer monitoring

can be expected to have the intended impact. It will analyze how the impact of the EU’s

monitoring depends on the member states’ procedures.

Finally the project will focus on the EU’s stability funds. Specifically it will study how

the procedures used to grant aid affect whether and how much aid is granted, and whether

the conditions required for such aid to be given are credible.